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Throwing (Sh)Aid: Optimizing Aid Conditionality for the Developing World 
Introduction 
My research has focused on investigating the optimal strategy for using aid conditionality 
to improve political conditions in developing countries.  This encompasses several fields of 
research.  Aid conditionality is defined as the attachment of strings to aid packages so that 
recipient governments must pass certain policies or meet certain goals in order for the flow of aid 
to continue.  The two typical uses for these are either political, mandating that countries 
implement elections or other increases in political freedom, or economic, forcing countries to 
shift their public sector spending or economic output towards results that donors deem as more 
desirable.  The use of aid conditionality began in the 1980s and has generated two clear sides in 
opinion on its ethics and importance as a policy tool.  Much of the aid community views it as a 
powerful tool to guide policy choices in countries with poor decision-making capacities, such as 
totalitarian dictatorships or nations rife with corruption.  Threatening to remove aid if actions 
aren’t taken can theoretically provide the necessary incentive for countries to take actions they 
may not consider in their own best interest without outside intervention.  
However, critics are quick to point out that the choice in policies that donors could chose 
for developing nations may not always be the best idea.  Firstly, donors might pursue only their 
own best interests and incentivize policies that support their own economies.  For example, they 
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may push recipients to increase commodity exports, which may be a suboptimal strategy for 
long-term growth.  Moreover, other experts see the continued power of donor nations, which are 
disproportionately from the global North, in policy discussions among the global South as an 
extension of antiquated colonial power structures where developing nations are subordinate and 
told what is best for them based on a Northern model of development that strips them of their 
flexibility and accountability as leaders.   
The importance of this topic cannot be understated.  Even small, percentile changes in the 
effectiveness of aid programs can alter the livelihoods of thousands of the world’s most 
vulnerable.  And if there are certain discernable causes of policy failure are detectable and 
correctable which could be corrected, there is no other excuse to allow ineffective methods to 
continue.  To optimize aid is to optimize a chief tool in alleviating global poverty, making the 
research question a critical matter.   
 
Baseline 
Before discussing the factors determining success for conditionality, it is necessary to 
establish the holistic success rate for the policy.  A review of the policies imposed onto 47 
countries found that 20 made some sort of progress towards being designated as “free” on a scale 
of democratic freedoms and rights.  However, only 8 countries managed to achieve the status of 
“free”, reaching a score of 70 on a 90 point scale reported each year (Emmanuel 859).  However, 
this analysis suffers from conflation of multiple time periods, which other analyses indicate hurts 
the data.  A review of democratization data that separated out the Cold War and post-Cold War 
periods found that since the fall of the USSR, aid conditionality has become much more effective 
(Dunning 418).  This is because Cold War aid had only a veil of democratization efforts, with a 
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true purpose of achieving influence among possible satellite states.  This caused the stated 
conditions to fall by the wayside, and thus render the policy defunct. Both analyses in this case 
use the same index for democratization effects, the Freedom House Index, so although the index 
is subjective, both claims are exposed to a parallel methodological risk that the index is skewed 
towards a single conclusion, therefore there’s no clear bias.  Ultimately, the claim on the 
transition of aid towards efficacy post Cold War is superior for several reasons.  First, it 
subdivides the data to zero onto specific events rather than lumping together decades of data, 
offering more specific insight.  Second, real world examples such as the interaction of Benin and 
France confirms that Western nations received more coercive power after the end of the Cold 
War.  France made empty calls for reform to the political system of Benin in the 1980s, but never 
followed through on their threat of suspension because of the knowledge that the USSR would 
merely instill the same aid package in their absence, providing no impact on the regime but 
merely reducing French influence in its former colony (Dunning 420).  Finally, the difference in 
effectiveness discovered for the post-Cold War era is so great that a statistical significance test 
unveils a p-value of .001, meaning that there is a .1 percent probability that the results are due to 
chance and not a statistical relationship (Dunning 418).  Thus both the broad-based trends as well 
as the real world record illustrates that in the newer age of aid conditionality, the trend is a 
positive one.  
The unique effect of aid conditionality policies compared to other aid strategies is that 
they occasionally result in full aid suspensions.  This gives the donor a second chance to induce 
democratization, where the vacuum of revenue left by aid creates leverage for a donor to instill 
more policies post-suspension.  Overall, 13 out of 29 of these aid suspensions provided some 
movement towards democratization, especially in Guatemala and Malawi (Crawford 80).  The 
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low success rate can be attributed to the diminished capacity of governments post aid-




The first conversation surrounding the factors that contribute to the effectiveness of aid 
conditionality is the effect of public opinion on how the country changes with the introduction of 
conditions.  This is because the imposition of conditions upon the government of another nation 
raises multiple legitimacy problems.  First of all, economic conditionality may require the 
recipient government to remove popular policies, inspiring retaliation. This is because citizens 
may view the government as a crony of an international donor (Bienen 749), running the risk of 
internal conflict or instability.  For example, the removal of food subsidies in the Dominican 
Republic sparked unrest as citizens became angered at the reduction in their discretionary 
income (Bienen 730).  The government of the Philippines encountered similar objections to its 
legitimacy as a result of its perceived deference to Western powers when their agreement to a 
conditionality package triggered protests (Bienen 735).  In these cases, both the theoretical and 
historical analyses line up to demonstrate a trend.   
A solution would be so-called “flexible response” lending, in which governments are 
given multiple options which they could use to fulfill their conditions (Collier 1402).  However, 
there still may be a certain degree of perceived control by donors, albeit minimized (Collier 
1403).  This is because an outside political force is still setting parameters and boundaries for the 
native policy-making institutions.  It is merely comparatively less restrictive and manipulative 
since recipients can at least make their own final decisions on which policy they can pursue.  
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Another option would be an adjustment of conditions on a country-by-country basis rather than 
as blanket policies (Leandro 291).  This could reasonably minimize animosity among the 
population because they’d see how the program was tailored into their own challenges as a state 
instead of one more country in a set of pawns for the West’s hegemonic chess game.   
Some sources also allege that democracy cannot be imposed externally on face, because 
the citizens of a country must become committed to democratic traditions and rules for policies 
to stay, or else future election cycles with vote-grabbing politicians will gradually advocate for 
the destruction of democratic policies if citizens aren’t actively invested in making democracy 
work (Grosh 48).  However, these claims are mainly theoretical, and haven’t been substantiated 
in real world policies or outcomes.  Moreover, the fact that there have been documented cases of 
successful external pushes for democracy implies that the problem is not a total incompatibility 
of entire cultures with democracy, but rather implementation-based issues with achieving that 
goal.  
 Unfortunately, the problem of the base of literature as a whole is that there is no broad 
analysis of the relationship between flexibility and effectiveness, relegating the debate to only a 
theoretical field.  The exception to this problem is the example of Uganda, which saw minimal 
public retaliation from aid regimes when the policies achieved high economic growth rates 
(Djikstra 331).  Another reason to individualize policies is that certain penalties will fail for 
certain countries.  For example, conditionality using normal aid suspension as a penalty failed in 
Angola because high oil revenues kept government coffers filled (Borzel 552).  Analyzing each 
recipient on a case-by-case basis thus provides the opportunity for tailoring each policy to 
maximize political outcomes.   
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This suggests that finding the goals that each country holds and using that as a base goal 
for conditionality may offer the best chance at appeasing the populace because it proves the 
policies are in their best interest.  Thus, from the literature that does exist, both the logical and 
grounded reasoning seems to reside in the camp of individualized, flexible lending plans as a 
method of reducing public backlash for aid conditionality.  
 
Donor Self-Interest 
The control of donor self-interest is also a barrier for effectiveness.  For example, the 
French aid regime with Cameroon was rendered innate because France wanted to retain 
influence with Cameroon even after the government repressed political freedoms, suggesting that 
hegemonic aims may restrict the success of aid policies (Emmanuel 873).  The Biya regime in 
1990 managed to delay instituting multiparty elections for two years because of substantial aid 
inflows from France even as they suppressed protests and manipulated election results 
(Emmanuel 868).  As a result, the democratic system that emerged was illegitimate and unable to 
accurately channel the will of the Cameroonian people.  This also occurred when economic self-
interest held back enforcement of English conditions on Nigeria (Crawford 92).  Even after a 
report by the U.S. Department of State outlined extensive repression of protests across the 
country in 1994, the U.K. authorized over 20 licenses for arms exports to the Nigerian military.  
This move was widely believed to be motivated by large British commercial interests in the 
country, including oil companies such as Shell operating in the Niger River delta (Crawford 92).  
Holistically, it seems that when countries are self-interested, they encounter conflicting sets of 
incentives that make threats of aid removal empty, thus ruining the coercive ability of aid 
(Dunning 411).  
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A possible solution would be outcome-based conditionality, which would move countries 
towards specific goals that would have to be published and therefore known to others.  Countries 
would be unlikely to admit subversive motives and thus wouldn’t be able to establish plans that 
lead to unfair outcomes for recipients.  However, such outcome based methods may reward luck, 
or punish countries for events that were outside of their control (Collier 1406).  The metrics for 
success would also be difficult, as inconsistent data sources or statistical outliers would muddle 
the decision making process on withdrawing aid (Brown 184).  A possible strategy for using an 
outcome based approach would be to index the outcome to account for economic disadvantage 
and instability, creating reasonable goals for even extremely dysfunctional states (Collier 1407).  
Unfortunately, this is mainly theoretical, with only rough conceptions of what such an index 
would look like.  Once again, this section of the debate seems doomed to remain theoretical at 
least until donors begin to diversify techniques enough for reasonable study.  However, looking 
purely to the logic presented and the historical role of self-interest in blocking aid suspensions, it 
seems that there is reasonable evidence that outcome-based approaches constrain the ability of 
donors to assert subversive agendas.   
With proper expectations and oversight to compensate for luck and unexpected 
circumstances, it seems that the literature agrees that donor self-interest is worth certain risks to 
constrain.  Considering that the only scholarship rooted in the real world is the statistical result 
that donor self-interest can neuter aid policy and multiple examples of self-interest short-
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Unconscious Bias 
Unconscious biases may also corrupt the ability of states to design effective conditions.  
This is because conditions, especially those concerning human rights and political freedoms, are 
based on Western conceptions of freedom which may not pose enough motivation for countries 
in the Global South to legitimately pursue them (Uvin 383).  Moreover, the development gap 
between donors and recipients can mean that donors ask recipients to prioritize certain goals over 
other ones that they do not understand as a result of their position: poor countries may want to 
focus on economic growth instead of freedom of the press, but be constrained in their policy 
goals as a result of Western conditionality (Uvin 380).  However, this analysis makes 
generalizations of Western policy, doesn’t quantify or empirically prove the bold claim, and 
doesn’t offer an alternative to the model.   
A possible solution could be an outcome or flexible response approach that gave 
maximum flexibility to recipient countries so as to let recipients seek the least biased option for 
them.  However, these are purely theoretical and there is no guarantee that there’d be a dilution 
of biases across multiple options.   
 
Adoption Speed 
Another sector of debate is on the speed of adoption required by the conditions.  Forced 
policy adoption at faster speeds is becoming more popular, as more nations attempt to grab for 
influence because of the increasing popularity of aid as a political tool (Grosh 60).  For example, 
forced multiparty elections in Kenya ignited ethnic tensions as different groups began grabs for 
power that turned violent (Grosh 47).  When donors announced an aid suspension to the country 
in 1991, a multiparty election followed within a month.  However, the rapid attempts at party-
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building and vote-grabbing ignited ethnic tensions as groups attempted to self-organize.  With 
little time to prepare, polarization set on quickly and it quickly spiraled into random bouts of 
violence, killing thousands (Grosh 49).  Indeed, considering the unstable and unpredictable 
nature of the political climates in certain developing nations, slower proposed policy adoptions 
and aid withdrawals may maximize coercive ability without the destabilizing effects of large aid 
shocks (Bienen 746).  The proportionality also comes into play, as certain aid regimes that 
withdraw all aid at the violation of a single condition, known as “short-leash lending”, can 
trigger similar instability in unpredictable environments (Collier 1402).   
 Besides the separation of different political conditions into smaller, individually enforced 
conditions, the separation of economic and political conditionality also may minimize any 
disproportionate spillover harms from a single misstep, ensuring that a single mistake on anti-
corruption or campaign finance efforts doesn’t trigger negative aid shocks across multiple sectors 
of a recipient country (Grosh 61).  However, while the destabilizing effects of short-leash 
lending is well documented in both statistical and historical literature, little evidence proves, 
beyond theory, that the subdivision of conditions and penalties could solve the problem.   
 
Proportionality 
Proportionality of penalties codified in aid conditions is also its own point of discussion. 
This is because of the pro-cyclical nature of aid, wherein aid can fuel a better political and 
economic environment which can make it easier for governments to fulfill conditions for aid 
agreements and create a positive feedback loop towards prosperity (Bulir 2050).  However, this 
effect can also occur in reverse, where negative aid shocks trigger instabilities that make it harder 
to fulfill future conditions (Bulir 2050).  Moreover, even the possibility of future aid flow 
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volatility can cause a reduction in private investment over concerns of future instability, 
compounding the losses from a single penalty (Bulir 2049).   
The result of this insight is that donors must strike a balance between keeping the threat 
of aid withdrawal high enough that recipients are effectively coerced into good governance, but 




Another point of debate is about how donor coordination in goals and implementation of 
aid conditionality can change the effects of the policies.  By conditioning more aid on the 
fulfillment of a single condition, multiple donors coordinating their aid regimes with similar 
policies seems to improve the chances of success (Emmanuel 865, Brown 189).  More 
international pressure may also solve another problem of aid conditionality: the lack of full effort 
by recipient governments.  Recipients often fulfill the conditions with only the bare minimum 
effort, reducing the efficacy of the policies as they commit low resources and effort towards 
them (Brown 184). Indeed, this reduced incentive for change resulted in reduced governmental 
reforms in Vietnam, Bangladesh, Nicaragua, Tanzania, Zambia, and Uganda (Djikstra 320).  
 By raising the stakes of non-compliance as well as signaling international condemnation 
for resistance, donor coordination can improve the effectiveness of the conditionality regime.  
This is why history has shown how a lack of donor coordination meant that when Cameroon and 
Guinea saw their aid suspended, they refused to change their policies since they had other donors 
whose conditions they were still following (Crawford 82).  This approach could be augmented 
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with an outcome-based approach if multiple donors use the same outcome indicators as their 
gauge for conditionality, combining the strengths of both methods (Leandro 291).  
The main problem with this broad-based advocacy of donor coordination is that it 
accumulates multiple penalties onto single violations, increasing the proportionality of response 
and withdrawal and therefore increasing the risk that a country is crippled by a single violation. 
Thus, the interaction of the two factors is inherently contradictory, in that donor coordination 
decreases risk via a signal of solidarity but increases risk via an increase in magnitude of 
punishment.  However, the advocacy of donor coordination seems methodologically sound 
because a statistical analysis found overall positive association of donor coordination as a 
strategy (Emmanuel 865), implying that the deterrent effect on conditionality violations is a net 
positive over any increased magnitude in punishment.  Moreover, the examples of Cameroon and 
Guinea provide individual, causally exact examples of how donor coordination could have 
improved compliance with aid policies, meaning that both quantitative and qualitative real world 
evidence finds donor coordination as a net benefit.   
 
Conclusion 
  The final image of the aid conditionality policy that best serves its goals is far more 
complex than the stock regime rolled out by donor states in the status quo. Firstly, policies drawn 
up for countries on a case-by-case basis to target their specific challenges are both theoretically 
and empirically sound in both achieving their goals and limiting popular backlash, as proven in 
Uganda.  Flexible response lending is also a logical tool against the challenges of pubic opinion 
by helping to foster an image of donors as cooperative partners rather than tyrants.  The latter 
prescription is more tentative, however, due to little real world testing of the method.  Outcome-
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based policies are also a tentative recommendation because, while they are also only theoretical, 
they offer reasonable solutions to two serious problems.  First, the subversion of aid programs by 
both the self-interests and unconscious biases of donors by forcing their goals into the light of 
international scrutiny.  And secondly, offering recipient states maximum breadth in their 
attempts to meet the conditionality.  Slower adoption speeds also logically maximize the 
outcome of the policy by reducing the possibility of large-scale instability triggers, given that 
slower changes in economic and political conditions would be less likely to spark large-scale 
instability.  Next, another theoretical but reasonable recommendation is the 
compartmentalization of penalties, whereby violating certain clauses of the conditionality 
agreement triggers a suspension of some part of the aid package, but doesn’t pull out the entire 
policy, lest the massive aid shock trigger instability that causes even more domestic chaos down 
the road and erodes the possibility of long term progress.  Finally, the prescription most 
supported by the literature in real-world evidence, through large statistical analyses as well as 
case studies, is that donors need to coordinate the conditions that they impose on recipient states 
both to signal international unity for political progress and to reduce the presence of conflicting 
incentives that allow countries to violate clauses without suffering for their misdeeds.  The real 
world success of this policy suggests that the greater coercive ability outweighs any increase in 
proportionality from the coordination of penalties.  Thus, the final prescription of the literature 
would be individualized, outcome-based, slowly adopted, compartmentalized, and coordinated 
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